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Monitoring and Disrupting Dark Networks 
A Bias toward the Center and What It Costs Us 
 




The goal of this article is to explore this analytic bias—how it is manifested, why it appears so 
extensive, and what unwitting limitations it imposes on our strategic options to counter terrorism. 
We use data from a study of the Syrian opposition network that was conducted in the CORE Lab 
at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey California (Lucente and Wilson 2013). The 
original study sought to provide a window into the armed opposition units against the regime of 
Syrian President Bashar Assad. This article proceeds as follows: We begin by reviewing the 
various strategies that can be used for disrupting dark networks. These can be broken down into 
two broad categories – kinetic and non-kinetic. The former uses coercive means for disruption 
while the latter seeks to undermine dark networks using with subtler applications of power. 
Drawing on a previous analysis, we illustrate how some of these strategies can be implemented, 
while at the same time highlighting our own bias in that study toward central actors. We then 
turn to an analysis of the Syrian opposition network, highlighting how a central focus can blind 
analysts to other important aspects of a network; in this case, elements that ultimately aligned 
themselves with the Islamic State of Syria (ISIS). We conclude with some implications for the 
future use of SNA to monitor and disrupt dark networks. 




The interest in dark networks—covert and illegal networks (Milward and Raab 2006; Raab and 
Milward 2003) that seek to conceal themselves and their activities from authorities—has been 
long-standing. Analysts have explored secret societies (Erickson 1981; Simmel 1906), criminal 
networks (Sparrow 1991), and price-fixing conspiracy networks (Baker and Faulkner 1993). And 
increasingly after 9/11, they have used social network analysis (SNA) as a tool to track and 
disrupt them (Carley, Lee and Krackhardt 2002; Koschade 2006; Krebs 2002; Magouirk, Atran 
and Sageman 2008; McCulloh and Carley 2011; Pedahzur and Perliger 2006; Rodriguez 2005; 
Sageman 2004). 
 
In an early review of this literature (Roberts and Everton 2011), especially the strategies used to 
counter terrorism, we identified a bias toward the kinetic approach—targeting of terrorists for the 
purpose of neutralizing, capturing, or eliminating them and their supporters. As our program of 
research and operational experience evolved, we came to understand that the sole reliance on the 
kinetic approach was too limiting. The “one-size-fits-all” kinetic approach prevents analysts 
from exploring the subtleties of a situation and developing strategies to fit a particular context. 
We therefore identified and recommended a range of strategic options from the kinetic to the 
non-kinetic. We briefly review these options in section one below to serve as a reminder that 
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tracking and disrupting terror networks call for a more nuanced understanding of terrorism and 
the strategies to counter it. 
 
As we expanded our exploration of terror networks, we uncovered another bias in our counter-
terrorism research. Although the choice of strategic options gradually expanded, the metrics and 
tools used to analyze these networks still were limited in scope. Analyses tended to focus on the 
removal of central nodes and brokers or the breaking of central ties and links among individuals, 
groups, or organizations. The pattern appeared to be widespread; the preferred metrics in 
counterterrorism had an analytical bias toward the network’s center. 
 
Our goal in this paper is to explore this analytic bias—how it is manifested, why it appears so 
extensive, and what unwitting limitations it imposes on our strategic options to counter terrorism. 
We use data from a study of the Syrian opposition network that was conducted in the CORE Lab 
at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey California (Lucente and Wilson 2013). The 
original study sought to provide a window into the armed opposition units against the regime of 
Syrian President Bashar Assad. This article proceeds as follows: We begin by reviewing the 
various strategies that can be used for disrupting dark networks. These can be broken down into 
two broad categories – kinetic and non-kinetic. The former uses coercive means for disruption 
while the latter seeks to undermine dark networks using with subtler applications of power. 
Drawing on a previous analysis, we illustrate how some of these strategies can be implemented, 
while at the same time highlighting our own bias in that study toward central actors. We then 
turn to an analysis of the Syrian opposition network, highlighting how a central focus can blind 
analysts to other important aspects of a network; in this case, elements that ultimately aligned 
themselves with the Islamic State of Syria (ISIS). We conclude with some implications for the 




Our earlier research in counter terrorism explored two generic approaches to disrupting dark 
networks:1 kinetic and non-kinetic (Roberts and Everton 2011). The kinetic approach involves 
aggressive and offensive measures to eliminate or capture network members and their 
supporters. Its objective is to target enemy combatants for the purpose of neutralizing, capturing, 
or eliminating them. The non-kinetic approach involves the use of restrained, non-coercive 
means for combating dark networks. It involves a more subtle and patient application of power 
by seeking to undermine terror networks “more through cooperation and collaboration with 
partners than through unilateral American action, more with the diplomatic and economic tools 
of national power than with the military, stressing inspiration rather than prescription” (Brimley 
and Singh 2008:313).  
 
Two strategies emerge from the kinetic approach: targeting and capacity-building. Targeting is 
U.S. led and capacity-building is host-nation led. Both can be pursued at the individual, group, 
and organizational (i.e., institutional) levels. For example, person-level targeting, often referred 
to as man-hunting (Marks, Meer and Nilson 2005), goes after individuals such as Saddam 
Hussein, Abu Busab al-Zarqawi, or key al Queda and ISIS leaders in Syria and Iraq. Group-level 
targeting focuses on particular teams, groups, or a subset of a terror network. Examples include 
                                                 
1 Dark networks are defined here as illegal and covert networks (Raab and Milward 2003). 
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the round-up of specific groups fashioning IEDs in Iraq (Peter 2008), the disruption of the Syrian 
recruitment network bringing jihadists into Iraq (Felter and Fishman 2007), and the shut-down of 
the financial network supporting the Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (Abuza 2003).  
Organization-level targeting puts the microscope on a particular organization to limit its 
activities or shutting it down. Examples include Malaysia’s successful effort to close down 
Luqmanul Hakiem, a jihadist religious boarding school (Rabasa 2005) and its closure of the Al-
Qaeda-linked Islamic NGO, Pertubuhan al Ehasan in 2002 (Abuza 2003). 
 
Capacity-building occurs when the U.S. military works "through, by, and with" indigenous 
forces to build their capacity to conduct effective targeting operations against common enemies 
as capacity-building. Here, the focus is on training and advising others’ security forces to 
become a professional force rather than pursuing a U.S.-led security strategy (Fridovich and 
Krawchuck 2007). Although some U.S. military references treat capacity-building as an example 
of the indirect approach, we prefer to characterize it as kinetic because of its use of aggressive, 
coercive tactics. Operation Enduring Freedom in the Philippines in 2002 was one such example. 
Special Operation Command forces deployed to Basilan, a southern island, to advise and train 
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Fridovich and Krawchuck 2007; Krawchuck ND; Wilson 
2006). The outcome of this effort was to reduce the threat posed by the Abu Sayyaf Group 
(ASG). By 2005, the armed strength of the ASG fell from an estimated 1,000 in 2002 to 
somewhere between 200 and 400 in 2005 (Lum and Niksch 2006; updated 2009). Like the 
targeting strategy, capacity-building can involve person-, group- or organization-targeting. 
The non-kinetic approach, like the kinetic approach, can be U.S. or host-nation led, depending on 
resources and capabilities. The intent is to secure the population’s safety and support and 
undermine the enemy’s influence and control. Five strategies emerge from the non-kinetic 
approach: institution-building; psychological operations (PsyOp); information operations (IO); 
rehabilitation, and tracking and monitoring.2 
 
The institution-building strategy promotes reconstruction in war-torn communities. It requires 
the active involvement of Civil Affairs forces that provide humanitarian and civic assistance and 
work in tandem with inter-governmental and inter-agency partners in the reconstruction process. 
The emphasis is on building healthy host-government institutions of governance, rule of law, and 
economic development (Fridovich and Krawchuck 2007; Kilcullen 2009). Interestingly, 
contemporary just war theorizing sees institution-building as a necessary criterion of what it 
means to fight a “just war” (Allman and Winright 2010). 
 
The psychological operations (PsyOp) strategy involves the dissemination of information for the 
purpose of influencing the emotions, perceptions, attitudes, objective reasoning, and ultimately 
the behavior of foreign nationals (individuals, groups, organizations, governments) so that they 
are more aligned with US goals and objectives during times of conflict and peace (U.S. Special 
Operations Command 2003).  Psychological operations also are employed to counter adversary 
propaganda and to sow disaffection and dissidence among adversaries to reduce their will to 
fight and ultimately to induce their surrender. One example was the UK’s plan to split the 
Taliban from within by securing the defection of its senior members and a large number of their 
supporters. It followed from Gordon Brown’s decision to put much greater focus on courting 
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“moderate” Taliban leaders and “tier-two” foot soldiers who fought more for money and a sense 
of tribal loyalty than for the Taliban’s ideology as well as from the U.S.’ consideration of a 
divide-and-conquer strategy to peel away some lower-level members of the Taliban and win 
back the population (Cooper 2009; Rubin 2011). The intent was to alter local jihadists’ 
perception that partnering with al Qaeda enabled them to achieve their political goals. PsyOp 
approaches also include deception tactics that attempt to turn terrorists or sub-groups within an 
organization against each other. 
 
The information operations (IO) strategy uses integrated employment of electronic warfare and 
computer network operations to combat terrorism. Electronic warfare refers to any military 
action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic 
spectrum or to attack the adversary. Computer network operations is one of the latest capabilities 
developed in support of military operations and stems from the increasing use of networked 
computers and supporting IT infrastructure systems by military and civilian organizations. Along 
with electronic warfare, it is used to attack, deceive, degrade, and disrupt information operations 
capabilities and to deny, exploit, and defend electronic information and infrastructure. Examples 
include the disruption of fund transfers, the monitoring of charitable donations, the detection of 
money laundering, black market activity and the drug trade. Activities also include interventions 
to compromise terrorists’ cell phone and online connections and the use of these platforms to 
locate jihadist leaders and their followers. 
 
The rehabilitation strategy uses moderate preachers to counsel terrorists and to instill in them a 
more balanced view of Islamic teachings. Singapore’s counter-ideological program founded by 
Muslim scholars who seek to “correct” the thinking of its detainees is one such example 
(Ramakrishna 2005, 2009, 2012). Established in 2003, the Religious Rehabilitation Group is an 
unpaid, all volunteer group of Islamic scholars who supplement their formal religious training 
with a year-long course in counseling.  Even before counseling sessions can begin, both male 
and female counselors study the “Jihad Manual” that prepares them to counter terrorists’ 
ideological distortions. Typically one counselor works with a member of the Singaporean 
Internal Security Department and a government psychologist on a particular detainee.  
 
In 2005 counselors began working with detainees’ families, especially the spouses, aided by the 
Interagency After-Care Group, which focused on the welfare of the detainees’ families. The 
Interagency After-Care Group provides financial assistance, teaches wives skills and helps them 
find work, and ensures the continued education of the children by negotiating school fee waivers 
and providing them with pocket money. The Religious Rehabilitation Group also extends its 
influence into the wider Muslim community by giving talks, sponsoring fora, disseminating 
publications, and even hosting a website, the aim of which is to “immunize” the minds of 
Singaporean Muslims against violent radical Islamist ideologies. In addition, the Singapore 
government is attempting to forge closer ties between Muslims and non-Muslims through the 
Community Engagement Program, Inter-Racial Confidence Circles in neighborhoods, 
workplaces, and schools. Similar rehabilitation programs also have been introduced to other 
countries such as Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. 
 
Finally, the tracking and monitoring strategy draws on John Arquilla’s (2009) insight that 
sometimes the best strategy is to do nothing at all. Not exactly nothing, but sometimes our 
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information on a dark network can be incomplete, so rather than taking immediate action, it is 
better to track and monitor certain actors with the hope of improving our knowledge of the 
network, which will in turn improve the selection of strategies adopted down the road: 
 
In the successful strikes against al Qaeda affiliates in Singapore, Morocco and Saharan 
Africa, the key doctrinal approach was to wait and watch for a considerable period, then to 
swarm the targets simultaneously at their moment of maximum illumination. This strategic 
patience grew out of the understanding that striking at nodes as they were identified might 
actually reduce the ability to detect and track other cells in the networks in question. It is a 
curious doctrinal point about netwar: the more that is disrupted, the less may be known 
(Arquilla 2009:34). 
 
To summarize, in this section we have distinguished between two general approaches to 
countering dark networks: kinetic and non-kinetic. The former approach pursues aggressive 
measures designed to eliminate or capture network members and their supporters, while the latter 
employs neither bombs nor bullets but instead uses non-coercive means to counter networks and 
impair a combatant’s will to fight. It includes activities such as the reconstruction of war-torn 
areas, the disruption of electronic fund transfer networks, information campaigns to win over the 
“hearts and minds” of local populations, efforts at the rehabilitation and reintegration of dark 
network members into civil society, and the tracking certain members in order to improve our 
knowledge and understanding of the network. 
 
Network Centric Counter-Terrorism Strategies 
 
The above framework broadened our range of options to counter terror networks beyond the 
kinetic to the more expansive non-kinetic strategies. But no matter what the level of analysis or 
whether the strategies were U.S or host-nation led, a retrospective analysis of our research 
identified a pattern. We focused on the removal of central nodes and brokers or the breaking of 
central ties and links among individuals, groups, or organizations. 
 
For example, in our examination of the Noordin Top network (Roberts and Everton 2011), we 
created two multi-relational3 networks—an operational network and a trust network. We then 
estimated four basic centrality measures (i.e., degree, closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector) 
for the operational network at the individual level (metrics not shown). Figure 1 identifies the 
most central nodes of the operational network by varying node size by degree centrality.4 We 
then described how a deception campaign—a non-Kinetic, PsyOp Strategy—could be waged 
against these central individuals “where the messages and observables (would) resonate the 
greatest” (Anonymous 2009:8-9). 
                                                 
3 These multi-relational networks are referred to as multiplex (multiple types of relational networks) that are 
combined and “stacked” together.   
4 Unless otherwise noted, we created the network graphs presented in this paper with the social analysis tool, Pajek 
(Batagelj and Mrvar 2015). 
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Figure 1:  Operational Network (Degree Centrality) 
 
We followed a similar in developing a targeting strategy (kinetic) for the trust network at the 
individual level. The trust network, which consisted of the friendship, kinship, religious and 
school networks, is shown in Figure 2. As with the operational network, the size of the node 
reflects degree centrality. We then discussed the prospects for a targeting campaign given the 
distinct core-periphery structure of this network. 
 
Figure 2: Trust Network (Degree Centrality) 
 
Despite our best efforts to develop and expand our strategic options, we kept returning to the use 
of centrality metrics to analyze the network and develop our strategies. This emphasis on 
centrality metrics is not uncommon. In fact, it appears to be the starting point for most analyses 
of dark networks (see e.g., Cunningham et al. 2013; Famis 2014; Gerdes 2015; Nash and 
Bouchard 2015; Patel et al. 2015). 
 
What we wish to explore for the remainder of the article is what this pull toward the center may 
cost us. In the case that follows, we illustrate how centrality measures do provide important 
insights about the network’s central nodes. However, we also learned the hard way that our bias 
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toward the center can and does obscure other aspects of the networks that had equal and 
potentially more value. 
 
The Case:  Syrian Resistance Network 
 
The year was 2011. The outbreak of rebellion and conflict against the Syrian regime of President 
Bashar Assad regime of Syrian prompted concerns over Syria’s chemical weapon sites. 
Resistance groups against Assad were proliferating and some included Jihadists rebel groups. 
The U.S. was concerned that the Syrian arsenal of chemical and biological weapons would fall 
into the hands of jihadists. Thus the U.S. government raised the question: Was it possible to 
distinguish among these rebel groups?  Was it possible for the U.S. to identify and work with 
some of these rebel groups while at the same time minimizing and avoiding contact with the 
jihadists? 
 
To answer this question, researchers (Lucente and Wilson 2013) gathered social network data on 
individuals, military units, and political organizations with ties to the Syrian Resistance 
movements. These were collected from a variety of social media sources, such as the Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube websites used by Syrian civil-military opposition elements, as well as a 
number of different reports from outlets such as the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) 
(Berman 2012; Bolling 2012; Holliday 2011, 2012a, b; O'Bagy 2012a, b, c), the Syrian National 
Council (Syrian National Council 2012), and Middle East Security Reports 2-6 (Sharp and 
Blanchard 2012). The research resulted in a multi-modal network consisting of 133 individuals, 
60 political organizations, and 59 military units,5 a network graph of which is presented in Figure 
3 where red nodes indicate individuals, green nodes indicate political organizations, and blue 
nodes indicate military units. 
                                                 
5 The original researchers treated the multi-modal data as what social network refer to as a one-mode network, 
which was technically incorrect since individuals are generally considered a different type of actor than political 
groups and military units. Ideally, they would have coded all of the data at the individual level using the leaders of 
the military units and political groups rather than the units and groups themselves. That granular level of data was 
simply unavailable, however, so the military units and political groups essentially functioned as “stand-ins” for the 
leaders of those units and groups. Thus, it is legitimate to treat and analyze the network as a one-mode network. The 
data have also been refined and cleaned since the original analysis, so the number of actors in the network is 
somewhat different. The network’s structure remains essentially the same, however. 
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Figure 3: Syrian Resistance Network (isolates hidden); Node Color Reflects Individuals 
(Red), Political Organizations (Green), Military Units (Blue) 
 
Based on their analysis of the network’s density and centralization, Lucente and Wilson 
concluded that it was federated network in that its units were “spread geographically throughout 
the operational battlefield,” which provided them with a great deal of autonomy (Lucente and 
Wilson 2013:24). Quoting Patti Anklam (2007:67), they note that in a federated network, “the 
core network serves as the hub of multiple, relatively autonomous hubs” (Lucente and Wilson 
2013:24). This is a possible interpretation, but Figure 3 suggests a somewhat more complex 
story.6 To be sure there are a number of actors on the periphery that are not tied to one another, 
but almost all have direct or indirect ties to either a central actor or a cluster of central actors 
(circled in Figure 3). Thus, the network appears to be neither a hierarchy nor a federation but a 
mix of the two. Indeed, centralization analysis of the network yields mixed results. In terms of 
degree (2.81%) and betweenness (6.81%) centrality, the network’s centralization is quite low, 
while in terms of closeness (66.94%) and eigenvector (73.17%) centrality, the network’s 
centralization is quite high.7  
 
More importantly for our analysis is that Lucente and Wilson focused on the relatively small and 
centrally group of actors (circled in Figure 3) that appeared to function as brokers in the network, 
in particular those who lay “between the rebellion’s political and armed opposition” (Lucente 
and Wilson 2013:24). There is nothing inherently wrong with such a focus since actors in 
positions of brokerage between insurgent groups should be of interest to researchers and 
                                                 
6 This is not the same network graph presented by Lucente and Wilson (2013: 25, Fig. 2), which they generated 
using the graph drawing program, Gephi (Bastian, Heymann and Jacomy 2009). It shows the network as consisting 
of two main clusters separated by a central cluster of a small group of actors whereas here the central cluster is 
broken down into three separate but central clusters. 
7 The standard centralization algorithm calculates the variation between the centrality scores of all actors in the 
network with the highest centrality score in the network. See Everton (2012:152). Centralization indices were 
calculated with the social network analysis program, UCINET (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman 2002). 
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analysts. However, by limiting our focus to only central actors we can blind ourselves to other 




Figure 4: Syrian Resistance Network (isolates hidden); Node Color Reflects Subnetwork 
 
Consider, for instance, Figure 4, which presents the same network, except now the color of the 
actors’ nodes reflect the subnetwork to which they were assigned by the Louvain clustering 
algorithm (Blondel et al. 2008) as implemented in Pajek (Batagelj and Mrvar 2015).8 As the 
figure indicates, the Syrian opposition network is far more complex than it initially appears. In 
particular, the Louvain algorithm identified 13 different subnetworks, suggesting that although 
some actors and clusters are more central than others (for example the orange colored nodes 
located at the center of the graph), there are numerous subnetworks that may be worthy of 
analysts’ attention. In particular, note the red colored subnetwork toward the top of the graph 
(circled). What is intriguing about this subnetwork is that it contains elements that often shifted 
their alliances but ultimately aligned themselves with the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS).9 This fact, 
however, is completely lost if we only focus on the network’s central actors. In other words, 
while focusing on a network’s central actors can provide important information about the 
network, limiting ourselves to only those actors can obscure other aspects of a network that may 
have equal and potentially more value. 
 
 
                                                 
8 There are numerous social network analysis clustering algorithms that assign actors to distinct subnetworks based 
on the network’s pattern of ties. In general, these algorithms assume that ties within a subnetwork are denser than 
across subnetworks. The Louvain method is a widely accepted clustering algorithm that has been implemented in 
numerous social network analysis packages. In Figure 8 node color indicates the subnetworks to which the various 
actors have been assigned by the Louvain algorithm. 
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Implications  
 
This brief analysis suggests several implications for the use of social network analysis to monitor 
and disrupt dark networks. First, the fact is that metrics, and in particular centrality metrics, tend 
to drive analyses of dark networks. Second, our use, some would say overuse, of centrality 
metrics then influences our description of the network and our visualization of its underlying 
structure.  Third, much of this partiality for things central is a function of our visualization 
process that leads us to focus on what is central over what is not.  
 
Centrality bias tends to drive analysis. The tendency for analysts to gravitate toward centrality 
metrics goes back at least to 1934 in Jacob Moreno’s ([1934] 1953) classic study, Who Shall 
Survive?, in which he identified the sociometric “stars” of the networks he examined. Since then, 
centrality’s properties have been repeatedly examined experimentally (Bavelas 1948, 1950; 
Cook and Emerson 1978; Cook et al. 1983; Emerson 1972a, b; Leavitt 1951), and social network 
analysts, such as Linton Freeman (1977, 1979), Phillip Bonacich (1972, 1987), Noah Friedkin 
(1991), and Steve Borgatti & Martin Everett (e.g., Borgatti 2005; Borgatti and Everett 2006; 
Everett and Borgatti 2005) have refined and expanded the measures of centrality, many of which 
are incorporated into current SNA software programs.10 As we saw above, however, other 
methodological approaches, such as clustering algorithms, can be helpful for identifying aspects 
of dark networks that centrality metrics may not. This is not to suggest that social network 
analysts ignore these other metrics. They do not. It is just that these other methods do not appear 
to receive the same attention that centrality metrics do. 
 
Leadership bias tends to drive interpretation.  Our conceptual maps and cognitive schema 
predispose us to “see” some things and ignore others (Axelrod 1973; DiMaggio 1997; Rumelhart 
1980). We see what our conceptual schemas “program” us to see.  So if our metrics signal that 
centrality is important, we calculate centrality measures. Finding central nodes, our schemas 
predispose us to attribute agency and leadership to those nodes. Thus, we begin the search for 
leaders. So, as the case analysis of Syria illustrates, if we find a central hub, we immediately 
attribute agency and leadership to the hub. Instead of asking what the hub might represent, our 
immediate interpretation is that leaders are in the hub and they are important and should be the 
focus on our attention. We confound centrality with importance and importance with leadership, 
most likely a consequence of our “great man” theories of history (Carlyle [1841] 2013 ; Hook 
1950) and organizational studies that view leadership as a key determining factor in 
organizational performance (Karadağ 2015).    
 
Visual bias tends to drive our focus. Another intriguing interpretation of our analysts’ consistent 
and unfailing focus on centrality appears to be driven, at least in part, by a visual bias. Some 
recent research suggests centrality is important to our vision (Bindemann, 2010). In laboratory 
studies of visual perception, observers of images of natural scenes presented on a computer 
screen look at the center of scenes first, which leads Bindemann to reject alternative explanations 
and argue that the findings demonstrate a “bias to the screen center that forms a potential artifact 
in visual perception experiments” (Bindemann 2010:2577). These experiments suggest a natural 
                                                 
10 For example, a recent version of UCINET (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman 2002) includes at least 23 different 
types of centrality measures, which is far more than the number of cohesion measures it estimates (11) and 
clustering algorithms it implements (12). 
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(and unconscious) tendency in all of us to focus on the center whether it is the center of a screen 
or the center of a network, suggesting that analysts may not be able to transcend their bias to 
what is central without consciously being made aware of it. Moreover, these three biases—
centrality, leadership, and visual—reinforce one another. Unless monitored and challenged, they 




We began this article with a review of the various strategies that can be used for disrupting dark 
networks, which we noted can be broken down into two broad categories – kinetic and non-
kinetic.  Next we turned to an analysis of the Syrian opposition network in order to highlight how 
a focusing on a network’s central actors can blind analysts to other important aspects of a 
network, in particular, individuals, political organizations, and military units that ultimately 
aligned themselves with the Islamic State of Syria (ISIS).  
 
This analysis led us to draw three important implications for the future use of social network 
analysis to track and disrupt dark networks: The first is that centrality metrics tend to drive the 
analysis of dark networks. However, as we demonstrated in this article, other methodological 
approaches (e.g., clustering algorithms) can prove helpful for identifying aspects of dark 
networks that centrality metrics may not. A second is that our conceptual schemas predispose us 
to attribute agency and leadership to central nodes and clusters. Instead of asking what these 
central actors might represent, our tendency is to assume that leaders are in the hub and thus 
should be the focus on our attention. Put simply, we confound centrality with importance and 
importance with leadership. Finally, we note that our tendency to focus on what is central 
appears to be driven, at least in part, by a visual bias. In laboratory studies of visual perception, 
observers tended to look at the center of images first, which suggests that in order to overcome 
their bias to that which is central, analysts have to be consciously aware of this tendency.  
 
None of our observations and research suggests that social network analysts ignore metrics that 
identify key actors and clusters in a network. Our position is that analysts should not just limit 
themselves to centrality metrics and their interpretations, especially when examining complex 
distributed networks like ISIS. In the subsequent years from our initial analysis of the Syrian 
Resistance Network, we have learned how costly our centrality, leadership, and visual biases 
have been. As we view the carnage that ISIS has inflicted on people from Syria to France, we are 
once again reminded of people’s limited ability to see and interpret what is. While it is not 
possible to eliminate our perceptual and cognitive biases, at the very least we should be aware of 
our tendencies and be prepared to guard against them by employing SNA’s expansive set of 
analytical tools to explore the whole network in all of its complexity.    
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